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Imaging the Visceral Soma: A Corporeal Feminist Interpretation 
 





Feminist philosophers of technoscience have long argued that it is vital that we question 
biomedical and scientific claims to an immaterial and disembodied objectivity, and also, more 
specifically, that we disable the conception of medical visualising technologies as neutral or 
transparent conduits to the “fact” of the body. In this paper we suggest that corporeal feminism is 
well situated to provide such a critique. Feminist phenomenologists over the past decade have 
theorised embodiment in a number of critical ways, many deriving concepts from the work of 
Merleau-Ponty, and emphasising the pliability and diversity of our body images and corporeal 
schematics. Others such as Elizabeth Wilson, Cathy Waldby and Drew Leder have considered the 
interdependence of our inner biology or viscerality with the socio-cultural inscriptions of 
embodiment. In this paper, these adaptations of phenomenology, and their account of the 
specificity and depth of embodied being, will be discussed and applied to the discourse of 






The human body is permanently open to 
its surroundings and can be composed, 
recomposed, and decomposed by other 
bodies. 
(Moira Gatens, 2000, p. 61) 
 
 
In contemporary visual culture the technical 
enhancement of the eye is often more accurately a 
translation of information which is not see-able, a 
making-accessible of that which is either not 
immediately visible (but through mediation can be 
made available to vision), or not visibilisable (by 
converting into graphic images data readings of that 
which would never be available to vision). These 
technologies, as aspects of the eye-function, seemingly 
enable us to see and know everything, from the DNA 
nuclei of a virus to the surface and texture of distant 
moons. We are now familiarised with a growing 
number of instrumental or hypermediated visions, via 
scopic tools used in science and medicine such as 
ultrasound, x-ray and endoscopes, among other 
scanning devices which translate the opaque into the 
visually accessible. Increasingly, instruments of 
vision permeate our mundane sensibility, such that 
vision is subject to the material and technical 
proclivities of the apparatus. Yet, in contemporary 
technoscience and biomedicine, it is assumed that 
imaging is a non-interventionist, mechanistic practice 
which transparently observes and records: an ocular 
subject (i.e., the pathologist, doctor or scientist) is 
configured as distinct from a world composed of 
orderable objects (such as the human body), each of 
which is waiting to be dis-covered and described. In 
these processes of biomedical imaging the corporeal 
and cultural agency of the body is marginalised. 
 
As feminist philosophers of technoscience have 
argued, it is vital that we question biomedical and 
scientific claims to an immaterial and disembodied 
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objectivity, and also, more specifically, disable the 
conception that technologies provide neutral or 
transparent conduits to the fact of the body. In this 
paper we suggest that corporeal feminism is 
particularly well situated to provide this critique. 
Feminists and phenomenologists throughout the 
nineties and into the new millennium have theorised 
embodiment in critical ways, many deriving concepts 
from the work of Merleau-Ponty and emphasising the 
“pliability” of the body (Kirby, 1997), while others 
have turned to the interdependence of our biology or 
viscerality with the technocultural inscription of 
embodiment (Leder, 1990, 1999; Waldby, 2000a; 
Wilson, 1999). By reworking the fundamental tenets 
of phenomenology, both corporeal feminists and 
“body-theorists” such as Drew Leder account for the 
specificity and depth of embodied being, and the 
combined effect of visualising apparatus and 
embodied perception in our collective understandings 
of the body. In what follows, these insights will be 
discussed and then applied to the discourse of 
biomedicine and the apparatus of magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI).  
 
Corporeal Feminism and Body Theory 
 
Corporeal feminism is associated with a diverse group 
of predominantly Australian theorists including 
Elizabeth Grosz, Elizabeth Wilson, Moira Gatens, 
Genevieve Lloyd, Vicki Kirby, Cathryn Vasseleu, 
Rosalyn Diprose, Penelope Deutsher, Robyn Ferrell, 
and Gail Weiss.1 In a move reminiscent of Merleau-
                                                 
1 The special issues of Hypatia on “Australian 
feminism” Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring 2000), and 
“Feminism and the body” Vol. 6, No. 3 (Fall 1991), 
and the special issue of Australian Feminist Studies, 
Vol. 14, No. 29, all contain articles from many of the 
corporeal feminists I have named. See also: Elizabeth 
Grosz (1994). Volatile bodies: Towards a corporeal 
feminism. Sydney: Allen and Unwin; Elizabeth Grosz 
(1995). Space, time and perversion: The politics of 
bodies. Sydney: Allen and Unwin; Gail Weiss (1999). 
Body images: Embodiment as intercorporeality. New 
York: Routledge; Moira Gatens (1996). Imaginary 
bodies: Ethics, power and corporeality. London: 
Routledge; Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd 
(1999). Collective imaginings: Spinoza, past and 
present. London: Routledge; Vicki Kirby (1997). 
Telling flesh: The substance of the corporeal. New 
York: Routledge; Cathryn Vasseleu (1998). Textures 
of light: Vision and touch in Irigaray, Levinas and 
Merleau-Ponty. New York: Routledge; Rosalyn 
Diprose (1994). The bodies of women: Ethics, 
embodiment and sexual difference. London: 
Routledge; Elizabeth Wilson (1998). Neural 
Ponty’s relational ontology, corporeal feminists 
suggest that we might separate the cultural and 
material or corporeal as a way to understand them, 
but their interrelation nevertheless precedes that 
separation. Corporeal feminism has emerged, in part, 
in response to the tenacity of this binarism. The idea 
that reality is a wholly cultural or discursive 
construction empties the body of material agency, or 
renders it a passive surface of inscription upon which 
culture writes. 
 
The confluence of corporeal feminism and 
phenomenology highlights the immediate, specific 
and the “concrete” conditions of an embodied 
subjectivity, which conventional phenomenological 
perspectives often fail to recognise in any localised 
context. Simply centralising the role of the body is in 
itself problematic for feminism, as it seeks to avoid 
the essentialist reduction of women to their bodies, or 
universalising the notion of what a body is. Rather, 
sufficient consideration must be given to how 
embodiment is lived out in its specificity, that is, not 
only in terms of its corporeal proviso, but in its 
inescapably cultural, social, historical, gendered, 
technological situatedness. There is not a universal 
body, or even two gendered bodies, but an ever-
changing and disorderly wealth of corporeal 
modalities. Although feminist theorists focus their 
concern on the problematic of gender and the sexed 
body, a consequence of their deliberate attentiveness 
to being-in-difference is the potential recognition of a 
number of other ontic osmoses emerging from the 
circumstances of techno-material specificity.  
 
Thus, for example, Gatens’s concept of the imaginary 
body articulates specificities across cultural practices 
and contexts, and attempts to show how “culture 
marks bodies” by producing the variable parameters 
within which bodies are generated (Gatens, 1999, pp. 
230-231).  In this regard, she writes:  
 
The imaginary body is socially and 
historically specific in that it is constructed 
by: a shared language; the shared psychical 
significance and privileging of various zones 
of the body … and common institutional 
practices and discourses (medical, juridical 
and educational) which act on and through 
the body.  (Gatens, 1996, p. 12) 
 
These practices and discourses use the body as a 
“vehicle of expression”, targeting particular parts of 
the body in terms of their interests; as bodies we are 
                                                                          
geographies: Feminism and the microstructure of 
cognition.  New York: Routledge. 
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all defined in terms of this imaginary body, and 
always-already historically and culturally delegated. 
While her critique does offer an alternative to the 
nature/culture or sex/gender model of conceptualising 
sexual difference, Gatens loses some of the material 
specificity and corporeal excess of embodiment 
captured by Merleau-Ponty. For Gatens the body is 
always wholly recuperated by the discourses which 
precede it, and as such she must reject the idea that 
tools, and the praxes which surround them, can have 
sometimes unintentional and ontic effects upon the 
body, and thus morphologically fashion different 
kinds of bodies. 
 
In her theorisation of the body image in Body images: 
Embodiment as intercorporeality, Gail Weiss (1999) 
acknowledges the body’s potential for technosomatic 
osmoses. Similarly to Gatens, she argues that as-
bodies we are embedded within cultural contexts 
where some kinds of endo- and exosomatic body 
forms are privileged and naturalised over others 
(Weiss, 1999, pp. 66-67). This explains, for example, 
the way in which immunological and pathological 
discourse surrounding AIDS and HIV define the 
parameters of an ideal body that is heterosexual, 
white, and male: a body which is not “penetrable”. As 
Waldby (1996) argues, this describes the immuno-
competent body, while the immuno-compromised 
body includes women and homosexual men; that is, 
leaky and permeable bodies without integrity. Within 
such discourse, itself thoroughly infiltrated by 
medical and military visualising apparatuses, and 
military metaphors of invasion and border protection, 
both the surface body and the body interior are 
configured in particular ways according to fixed 
representations of body-standards. Yet for Weiss 
bodies are particularised not only or even 
predominantly by sex or gender, but through an 
intercorporeal and mutable palimpsest of cultural 
norms according to race, ethnicity, age, class, 
disability, equipmental fields and tool-use. While 
there are hierarchies of collective body images within 
which we are expected to “install” our individual 
corporeal schemas, the body image is also a site of 
cultural contestation which is open to “a vast horizon 
of possible differences”: 
 
Exploring the corporeal possibilities that 
have been foreclosed by a given culture’s 
own imaginary itself helps bring into being a 
new imaginary - one that does justice to the 
richness of our bodily differences. Changing 
the body image, I maintain, must involve 
changes in the imaginary … [W]e must in 
turn create new images of the body, dynamic 
images of non-docile bodies that resist the 
readily available techniques of corporeal 
inscription and normalisation that currently 
define ‘human reality’. (Weiss, 1999a, p. 67) 
 
Weiss thus provides an important elaboration on the 
body image in terms of its potential for corporeal and 
cultural transformation. Indeed, more than this: the 
body-image retains its material agency and relational 
ontology while simultaneously being embedded 
within specificities of culture and, we would add, 
specificities of media and equipmentality.  Her theory 
allows for the possibility of an “alternative 
metaphysics” which can “adequately account for the 
processes of construction, destruction, and 
reconstruction that are constitutive of human 
corporeality” (Weiss, 1999a, p. 67).  In accounting for 
both the equipmental and corporeal effects of 
magnetic resonance imaging, we will suggest that 
such an “alternative metaphysics” is emerging within 
technoscience. 
 
More recently, corporeal feminists such as Grosz 
(1994, 1995) and Wilson (1998, 1999) have pointed 
out that there is a lack of attention directed towards 
the material specificities of biological function, and 
consequently to the space and matter-ing of the 
organic, fleshy and visceral endosoma. In other 
words, the body has largely been figured as purely 
exosomatic – as a surface for inscription and 
representation. Wilson (1999), for example, analyses 
hysteria within an informed critique of somatic and 
biological detail, arguing that a full-bodied account of 
the body must do more than treat the body as a shell 
or container, or as a surface for social inscription. 
Rather, we must become more literate about our 
knowledge and experience of biology - including the 
muscular capacities of the body, the function of the 
internal organs, the biophysics of cellular metabolism, 
and the microphysiology of circulation, respiration, 
digestion and excretion (Wilson, 1998). This critique 
has become increasingly relevant as it pertains quite 
specifically to the relation between televisualised 
technosoma, and the incursion of tele-technologies 
into the body, particularly in the context of 
endoscopic apparatuses which work to render the 
inside of the body visible, and thus literally draw the 
visceral into our collective and individual body 
images. 
 
In Volatile Bodies, Grosz (1994) tackles this issue of 
the opaque and overlooked corporeal inside as a way 
to deconstruct both the mind and body binarism and 
the traditional Cartesian model which privileges the 
psychical interior (consciousness) over the mute 
corporeal surface, effectively masking the essential 
significance of material differences and specificities. 
Against this, Grosz theorizes a non-hierarchical 
process of articulation between inside and outside, 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 6, Edition 1 May 2006  Page 4 of 13 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This document is subject to 
copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the 
publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
 
and the biological and the psychical (Grosz, 1994, p. 
7), contending that such an inversion of the 
inside/outside logic will inevitably speak the concrete 
specificities of embodiment.  
 
Combining the insights of Schilder with Merleau-
Ponty’s corporealisation of perception, Grosz 
introduces the term “body phantom” as a way both to 
describe an alternative to the common understanding 
of technology as extension or prosthesis, and to adjust 
our conceptual grasp of artificial or synthetic 
augmentations to the “natural” body: 
 
The body phantom is the condition of the 
subject’s capacity not only to adapt to, but 
also to become integrated with various 
objects, instruments, tools and machines. 
It is the condition of the body’s inherent 
openness and pliability to, and in, its 
social context. ... It is the condition that 
enables us to acquire and use prosthetic 
devices - glasses, contact lenses, artificial 
limbs, surgical implants - in place of, or 
supplementary to, our sense organs. 
(Grosz, 1992, p. 6) 
 
Yet, while attention is paid to prosthetic somatology, 
by some accounts Grosz still does not seriously attend 
to the corporeal interior, and “all the oozings and 
pulsings that literally and figuratively make up the 
differential stuff of the body’s extra-ordinary 
circuitry” (Kirby, 1997, p. 76). In this context, it is 
worth considering in some depth the work of Drew 
Leder, a body-philosopher who attends to the 
complex intertwining of inner and outer corporeality.  
 
Leder’s principal thesis in The Absent Body explores 
the way in which the body in-use partially recedes 
from our conscious perception, and specifically how 
this tendency to some extent encourages and supports 
a Cartesian-like metaphysics of disembodiment 
(Leder, 1990). In many of our day-to-day habitual 
activities, our body retracts from immediate 
awareness, and this withdrawal has led us to believe 
that the body is epistemically and agentically 
peripheral to the actively knowing and perceiving 
mind. According to Leder, it is this intrinsically 
paradoxical nature of bodily presence - its inescapable 
presence as our corporeal ground on the one hand, 
and its tendency towards absence on the other - that 
accounts for the tenacity of the mind/body hierarchy 
in Western thought.  
 
Leder identifies three modes of absence specific to 
human embodiment - focal, background and depth 
disappearance. Firstly, he argues that focal 
disappearance is an effect of the way in which the 
sensorimotor surface of our body - our corporeal 
extremities - are characterised by a form of self-
concealment which is directly related to the “ecstatic” 
nature of corporeality. Contact with the world and its 
objects is first and foremost through the body-surface, 
and as such this exterior functions as the boundary 
and horizon which makes such tactile, kinaesthetic or 
multi-sensory acquaintance with that world possible. 
When one’s hand touches another physical object, the 
phenomenon of a “null point” occurs, such that we 
attend to the telos or trajectory of action, or to the 
general process of handling itself, rather than to the 
point of contact between skin and the object. The 
face, the hands, and the mouth, by virtue of their 
corporeal specificity, most frequently play this focal 
role in our communication with the world (Leder, 
1990, p. 105). 
 
Leder supplements this description with the slightly 
different yet complementary notion of background 
disappearance, which describes a type of absence that 
occurs when regions of body are not the focal origin 
of our sensorimotor engagements, and momentarily 
adopt a background or supportive role, again 
disappearing from explicit awareness (Leder, 1990, 
pp. 25-26). This describes the sensory engagement of 
more complex and/or articulated actions, such as 
holding a book while in the process of reading, or 
walking while conversing on a mobile phone; in both 
cases, the hand plays a background rather than a focal 
perceptual role. Although both focal and background 
disappearance are not directly related to the visceral, 
Leder derives the final mode of absence - depth 
disappearance - by defining it in relation to the other 
two modes which have pertained specifically to the 
body perimeter. The paradox of bodily presence-
absence is for Leder quite clearly of a different order 
when applied to our corporeal depths, where the mode 
of disappearance is more pronounced and to a large 
extent irrecoverable. Our inner bodily processes and 
organs remain perceptually elusive, in contrast to the 
more tangible and visible surfaces of our somatic 
exterior which, by virtue of their ecstatic being-in-
the-world, sustain a more prominent and pervasive 
presence in the everyday experience of our 
environment: 
 
My hands, in order to explore and work 
upon the world, must extend outward from 
my corporeal extremities. My expressive 
face can form a medium of communication 
only because it is available to the Other’s 
gaze. No organ concealed in the hidden 
depths of the body could actualise 
intersubjectivity in this way.  (Leder, 1990, 
p. 11) 
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The visceral, in contrast to the perceptual or sensory 
surface of the body, is marked by a deeper, innate 
form of resistance which “falls back” from our 
conscious perception and control (Leder, 1990, p. 69). 
Leder identifies these visceral resistances - which 
vary according to their nature as muscle, organ, flesh, 
blood and bone - such that the “notion of depth 
indicates not only a physical site but a genuinely 
distinct phenomenological dimension [italics added]” 
(Leder, 1990, p. 53). This distinction works according 
to a dynamic of exosomatic outward projection and 
endosomatic introjection, where the latter falls back 
to a level of imperceptibility.  
 
Thus, Leder concludes, it is only the corporeal 
surface, able to “actualise intersubjectivity” and shape 
our everyday experiential field, which accounts for 
the tendency within the tradition of phenomenology 
to identify the body principally in terms of its outer 
boundaries. Thus, we have cosmetic surgery 
performed on our faces and breasts, not on our 
spleens; we don’t control our digestion with the same 
degree of “personal mastery” with which we control 
our posture or surface musculature, because it 
functions primarily according to the tacit structure of 
autonomic2 operation (Leder, 1990, pp. 46, 48). 
Admittedly, as Leder acknowledges, while our 
surface organs may also be forgotten via their varying 
structural roles, focal or background, this self-
effacement is typically temporary and reversible. 
Visceral processes, on the other hand, exhibit an 
innate resistance, because they recede beneath the 
intentional “arc” of personal control altogether: 
 
Unlike the surface organ in background 
disappearance, a viscus [internal organ] is 
largely irreversible with corporeal foci. It 
cannot be summoned up for personal use, 
turned ecstatically upon the world. Its 
recessiveness is not simply the function of 
a current gestalt but of an innate 
resistance.  (Leder, 1990, pp. 54-55) 
 
By acknowledging the particular phenomenological 
significance of the visceral dimension of our 
embodiment, Leder goes some way towards 
addressing the deficiencies both he and corporeal 
feminists have identified in Merleau-Ponty’s project. 
As he suggests in a later article, the “primacy of 
embodiment and the primacy of perception that 
Merleau-Ponty advocates are usually understood as 
                                                 
2 Autonomic is a physiological term referring to the 
non-voluntary functioning of the body. e.g., the 
autonomic nervous system is responsible for the 
control of bodily functions not consciously directed, 
such as heartbeat. 
one and the same thesis”, yet the visceral foundation 
remains largely unacknowledged (Leder, 1999, pp. 
200-202). In particular, Leder draws attention to 
Merleau-Ponty’s term “flesh”, which he suggests 
already embodies connotations of the bodily surface - 
its “superficial muscle and fatty tissue” - and thus 
reveals phenomenology’s tendency to privilege this 
region of the body (Leder, 1999, p. 204). Leder’s 
specific response to this oversight is to replace the 
singular word flesh, with the terms “flesh and blood”, 
which account for both the dry exterior and the 
previously suppressed “wet” dimension - the word 
“blood” operating as a trope for viscerality.  
 
From the perspective of corporeal feminism, 
however, Leder’s analysis is flawed in several 
respects. Firstly, he draws a dramatic distinction 
between our experiences of the exosomatic and 
endosomatic dimensions, claiming that we can only 
ever attain oblique awareness of the latter. This 
analysis of bodily absence depends on a definition of 
the visceral as the region of our body which is 
invariably secluded and concealed from our everyday 
awareness and perception. Accordingly, our visceral 
depths constitute the most hidden dimension of our 
lived embodiment, and thus for Leder “rarely make an 
appearance in our life-world” (Leder, 1990, p. 111). 
The way in which Leder figures this relation as 
largely disconnected and divided by an axis of 
visibility and sensation is problematic, however, in 
that it fails to capture the meshing of the visceral into 
the lived experience of our embodiment, or our 
experience of what Julia Kristeva (1982) has termed 
the abject, the material surfacings of blood, mucus, 
and faeces which properly belong in the ontic 
domains of neither object or subject. In this respect, 
women’s bodies regularly transgress Leder’s 
conceptualisation of the perpetually contained and 
unrevealed visceral interior: when menstruating, for 
example, our visceral depths “come to the surface” of 
our corporeality; when pregnant, inner bodily changes 
and foetal movements are frequently both focal and 
visible. Leder’s model is thus unarguably one that 
describes a specifically masculine embodiment, and 
viscera which are more easily “negotiated” and 
overlooked.  
 
Nevertheless, it would seem that Leder’s recognition 
of our bodily interior is particularly salient in the 
context of biomedical imaging apparatuses which 
precisely target these previously imperceptible 
visceral depths. Magnetic resonance imaging, for 
example, like other biomedical imaging technologies, 
is presumed to enable direct perception of viscera-in-
action. Yet Leder suggests that the variety of 
exscriptive technologies used to visibilise internal 
organs only highlight and exacerbate our alienation 
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from the strangeness of our own interiors. Clearly, his 
reliance on a strict inside/outside dialectic, belies a 
more latent oppositionality between nature’s 
“otherness” and the cultural known, and rests on a 
conventional interpretation of the relation between 
our bodies and visualising prostheses. In contrast, 
feminist theorists such as Haraway (1991) have 
revealed the cyborgian affinities between our own 
sensorium and those of perceptual machines, 
recognising that the body in its entirety is always 
open to sociotechnical arrangement. We can and do 
have an instrumental awareness of the interior of our 
bodies; our familiarity with skeletal representations 
via X-ray technology is but one example of how we 
quite familiarly envision our insides within an 
instrumental framework. Magnetic resonance imaging 
is another example of such cyborg perception. 
 
As we will show, the hybrid condition of technical 
and corporeal seeing can be explored via the 
particular biotechnological apparatus of magnetic 
resonance imaging. As a computer-conversion 
technology, MRI optically renders quantitative non-
optical data into recognisable visual images which 
can be ‘read’ and interpreted on the screen. In this 
respect, MRI follows the usual visual prejudice of 
scientific discourse in its translation of non-visual 
information into a visual display. Foregrounding the 
role of instrumentation in medical knowledge thus 
reveals the way in which technics and techniques are 
both equipmentally and corporeally embodied; that is, 
the way they are incorporated into our perceptual and 
bodily experiences of the lifeworld.  
 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
 
MRI deploys images from body territories 
which have remained dark to other kinds of 
illumination … [it] has shifted our sense of 
transparency. (Bettyan Kevles, 1997, p. 176) 
 
If all technology implicates and supplements 
bodily organs … then the biomedical 
technologies give an extra depth to this 
implication, and in the process throw into 
question the viability of a distinction 
between natural inside and technical outside 
of the organ-ism, or of setting out any 
defining limit or distinct interface between 
organs and technics. (Catherine Waldby, 
2000, p. 31) 
 
Magnetic resonance imaging is among a number of 
contemporary digital imaging technologies which are 
renowned for their ability to non-invasively visualise 
the interior as it is “live and functioning” (Kember, 
1998, p. 55). Typically, scans are made of the head 
(brain), knee or torso, and these various body-parts 
are enclosed in a cylindrical apparatus which 
generates a powerful intermittent magnetic field. The 
intensity of the magnetic field works to excite the 
alignment of hydrogen atoms in the body. Each time 
the emissions cease, these atoms return to their 
original “relaxed” positions, emitting small electric 
currents which vary according to the density of their 
location in organs, tissue, blood or bone. In this way, 
the often subtle biochemical and physical differences 
between distinct corporeal substances can be 
calibrated and converted into a high-resolution 
greyscale image.  At each end of the spectrum, tissues 
which are high in water content or hydrogen appear 
white, whereas those which do not, such as bone, are 
darker; in particular, MRI is able to reveal the 
complexity of soft tissue and organs. The resulting 
images are the work of expensive and powerful 
computer hardware and software technology, and they 
offer precisely detailed macro-perceptual slices or 
cross-sections of the body which are recognisable in 





Magnetic resonance image of male head 




For most patients, scanning time may last for around 
thirty minutes, during which the body or body-part 
must be kept completely still. In our observations of 
the MR machine in operation,3 we were firstly struck 
                                                 
3 Many thanks to Dr Steve Davies for inviting us in 
August 2000 to observe the magnetic resonance 
machine in operation at St John of God Hospital, 
Subiaco, Western Australia. Both Dr Davies and the 
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by the sheer size of the cylinder required for full body 
and head scans. Upon entering the scanning room 
clad in protective vests, after several minutes we 
found that the very loud pulsating hum - caused by 
the flux of magnetic field generation - was 
moderately difficult to bear. From our brief 
experience, it was immediately clear that for human 
body-part interiors to be rendered as data in this way, 
and then translated as sectioned images onto 
transparencies to be “made ready” for the doctor’s 
expert interpretation, the patient must confront both 
the arduous work of remaining motionless, and the 
daunting and concrete materiality of the throbbing 
enclosure. In a visceral sense, too, the hydrogen 
atoms in the body matter to be imaged can be said to 
“behave” in a techno-specific way according to the 
density of the particular corporeal substance in which 
they are located. Thus it is not the case that 
biomedical imaging produces a dematerialised data-
body, but rather that the infosoma or human-
apparatus gatherings specific to particular scanning 
procedures are undeniably corporeal and substantial. 
It is these technosomatic effects, specific to the body-
tool ontology of MRI, that are of primary interest 
here. 
 
In much biomedical imaging the apparatus translates 
non-visible information - or information that is simply 
not of the order of the visible - into a readable 
macroscopic image. The ensemble of tools and bodies 
- complex machines, scanning devices, screens and 
hard drives, and those doctors and technicians who 
operate, service and adjust them - work to reveal that 
which can be configured as data code, thereby 
rendering unknowable that which cannot be so 
rendered.  The scanning process may also contribute a 
number of wayward “artefacts”, often inexplicable 
visual objects in the image which, if not recognised as 
such by the expert, can be misinterpreted. The 
patient-body, immobilised, “answers” viscerally, or at 
a molecular level, to the magnetic fields or sound 
waves of the apparatus. The doctor or radiologist 
appropriates or embodies a dissected and ‘machinic’ 
vision, or is able to prioritise a particular computer-
aided “order” of vision in greyscale, where gaseous or 
fluid substances are luminous, and solid or dense 
substances such as bone are represented in darker 
shades. In James Gibson’s terms, the visual world, 
where sight is ecologically intertwined with other 
senses to create three-dimensional depth, is obscured 
in favour of the visual field, where sight is 
intentionally detached from the environment and the 
eyes fixated to create two-dimensional or projected 
visuality (cited in Jay, 1994, p. 4). At no juncture is 
                                                                          
resident radiologist kindly gave of their time and 
expert knowledge in extended interviews.  
this process a transparent seeing of what is 
objectively there, but rather a phenomenological, 
mediated, artifactual and many-sided collaborative 
effect or achievement. As Ihde (1991) suggests, a 
more accurate understanding of technoscientific and 
expert observation as an active and corporeal seeing, 
acknowledges the essential co-operative effects of 
praxis and perception, and of instruments and bodies, 
in all scientific activity; that is, the embodiment 
relations that ensue.  
 
In a similar way, Cartwright argues that the active 
body-building practices of biomedical science must 
be acknowledged as they are embodied in its 
technologies and domains of expertise (Cartwright, 
1995, p. 28).  As Haraway famously states: 
 
The ‘eyes’ made available in modern 
technological sciences shatter any idea of 
passive vision; these prosthetic devices 
show us that all eyes, including our own 
organic ones, are active perceptual systems, 
building in translations and specific ways of 
seeing, that is, ways of life. There is no 
unmediated photograph or passive camera 
obscura in scientific accounts of bodies and 
machines; there are only highly specific 
visual possibilities, each with a wonderfully 
detailed, active, partial way of organising 
worlds.  (Haraway, 1991, p. 190) 
 
This position rejects the notion that bodies or 
machines are entities of either epistemic or ontic 
integrity, that scientific accounts of bodies are 
separable from or ontologically prior to technics, or 
that bodies are in any way reducible to their 
individual parts. The biological body is not the 
essential body, a reality waiting to be discovered, but 
always-already it is a technically-augmented or 
technosomatic agent, and always partially of our own 
fabrication.  
 
For example, informatic renderings according to the 
logics of the computer and screen rework the body as 
a three-dimensional coordinate space to be traversed 
and explored. MR images, because they can be 
stacked in such a way so as to produce a three-
dimensional representation, are considered primary 
resources in the creation of 3D animated body-atlases. 
Software developed for manipulation of MRI, CT and 
photographic images of the Visible Human Project4 
                                                 
4 See 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/visible/visible_hum
an.html. The Visible Human is a project of the 
National Library of Medicine in Bethesda, U.S. It 
comprises two data-sets of what were actual cadavers 
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configure the data body as topography and landscape, 
inviting the user on a navigable virtual flight through 
the Visible Man.5 In other applications (see figure 
opposite) users can orient themselves with a mouse-
directed avatar. Such representations impart a visceral 
schematic into our collective body-image, an 
understanding and experience of our own insides as 
comprised of a discrete collection of layers and 
organic components. At times we can sense internally 
(e.g., the “gut feeling”) or haptically (e.g., bumps and 
lumps such as swollen glands) the material factuality 
of our interior, but we also rely on the telepresent 
collaboration of biomedical imaging to visualise both 
the layout and the dynamic “oozings and pulsings” of 
the endosoma (Kirby, 1997, p. 76).  
 
In the case of both the Visible Human Project and 
MRI, there are then several attendant exo- and 
endosomatic agencies which work to further collapse 
the subject-object, tool-body distinctions. With regard 
to an organic agency, for example, breast tissue has 
long been considered a disobliging participant in 
ultrasound and mammogram imaging, in that it is 
materially uncooperative to the manipulations of the 
scanning device, and its tissues do not always reveal 
themselves to the satisfaction of radiologist or doctor 
(Cartwright, 1995). 
 
                                                                          
– male and female, launched in 1993 and 1995 
respectively - involving an ensemble of imaging 
techniques. Waldby describes this process as follows: 
“The body was placed … in a MRI machine and fully 
scanned. This first imaging process was to provide a 
template for the intact body, which was to be digitally 
‘duplicated’. It was then frozen … cut into four 
sections and each section was CT and MRI scanned. 
… After that, the body was systematically and very 
finely sliced. … After each planning, the cross-
section of the remaining body section was digitally 
photographed, so that each photograph registered a 
small move through the body’s mass. Each of these 
photographs was then converted into a computer data 
file, and their position in the overall body registered 
according to the initial template” (Waldby, 2000a, p. 
14). The full data-sets enable volumetric stacking, 
animation and manipulation, and are available for 
download from the U.S. National Library of Medicine 
website. 
 
5 These traversable volumetric interiors actually use 
flight simulation software in their construction, so the 




Visible Male pelvis with prostate gland. 
Richard Robb (1996) Mayo Foundation. 
 
 
As such, the interior body is imbued with an agency 
which at times may be inscrutable or obdurate, but it 
is an agency nonetheless. Indeed, medicine deploys 
its apparatuses - MRI, PET and CT scans, volumetric 
models, anatomical atlases - as machines with which 
to overcome precisely the resistance of viscous and 
fleshy bodies to scientific modes of knowing. Yet the 
body in its own recursive materiality can be seen to 
“order” the ensemble of visualising strategies. MRI, 
for example, is a technique enabled by several 
molecular and visceral specificities: hydrogen nuclei 
have a magnetic resonance signal; fat and water have 
many hydrogen atoms; human bodies are primarily 
made up of fat and water, and thus are comprised of 
approximately 63% hydrogen atoms (Hornak, 2003). 
This combination of technical “readability” and 
visceral accommodation render the MR visualising 
process possible. There exists a complex interrelation, 
for the phenomenological condition of embodiment is 
also a primary ontic ingredient. That is, the body-
subject’s incorporative aptitude, its capacity to 
intercorporealise both tools, and collective yet 
culturally specific aggregations of the body image, 
are precisely what enable the various technovisual 
and medicalised “versions” of the biological body to 
take hold. 
 
In a less compliant example, in the case of the Visible 
Human Man the initial MRI imaging process was 
performed on the intact body due to the quite simple 
fact that even when frozen at extremely low 
temperatures, the body-matter could not “hold 
together” once sliced: the body’s mass was 
“effectively obliterated … each planed section 
dissolving into sawdust due to its extreme 
desiccation” (Waldby, 2000a, p. 14). Moreover, even 
despite such disintegration, the body-membrane 
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performs its own ironies; tattoos on the surface of the 
Visible Male body are tenaciously reconstituted on 
the virtual skin of the volumetric reconstruction (see 
figure below), such that the uniquely marked identity6 
of the body-in-life resurfaces, and the data-set 
abruptly loses its status as representative prototype of 




Head and upper torso 3D reconstruction of Visible 
Male data set 




On the other hand, the technical agency of the 
apparatus itself collaborates in this body-making. The 
pictorial logic of MRI imparts a concreteness to the 
brain’s bio-chemical processes, both capturing and 
privileging abstract non-geometric processes, by 
paradoxically reducing them to something less 
complex. These visual delineations of molecular 
events then serve as “actual” ocular markers of 
distinct pathologies.  Here, MRI quite evidently does 
not function as a transparent or visually isomorphic 
representation of the body; it instrumentally extends 
and reconfigures the natural scientific subject’s 
epistemological domain, while at the same time the 
image itself becomes as it were an aspect of the body, 
a concrete material trace of the body’s corporeality. 
Thus, this visualising process simultaneously 
translates and recreates the living processes of the 
body studied (Cartwright, 1995, p. 23). The MR 
image is a computerised interpretation; a visual model 
                                                 
6 Convicted murderer Joseph Paul Jernigan donated 
his body to medical science while on death row; upon 
execution by lethal injection his body was 
appropriated by the National Library of Medicine 
VHP coordinators and medical experts. 
synthesised from emitted pulses and molecular 
reaction. Crucially, it is only after the MRI signal is 
transformed by a series of algorithms, and translated 
by computer, that it is able to graphically register a 
recognisable visual representation and operable 
diagnostic form in the shape of voxels and pixels. 
Thus, while MRI seems perfectly consonant with 
medicine’s historical and epistemological privileging 
of sight, it is more precisely a process of translation. 
The production of biomedical knowledge, such as the 
analytical physiological knowledge generated by 
MRI, necessarily effects a partial instrumentalisation 
of the body, and thus the re-interpretation and re-
configuration of its corporeality.  
 
This reciprocity between body and tool, and the way 
in which apparatuses such as MRI have been 
“instrumental” in how we realise our inner workings 
can be theorised as an essential supplement to 
Merleau-Ponty’s body image, such that our interior 
morphology becomes a requisite part of the relational 
ontology of intercorporeality. If instrumental ways of 
seeing are aspects of embodiment, such that observer 
and observed are inextricably engaged, when that 
perceptual merger turns inward, inside and outside are 
similarly confounded. Although Leder is one of few 
phenomenologists who attend to the visceral, this 
perceptual arrogation of MRI and other imaging tools 
directly counters his recuperation of the inside/outside 
dichotomy, and his claim that the visceral mode of 
being is one of terminal disappearance. In the case of 
the Visible Human, for example, the body interior is 
made available as serialised cryosectioned surfaces 
for use on the Internet and digital-visual media 
networks, “reconstituted along the lines of scanning 
and surface data most appropriate for digital image 
processing and digital file standardization” (Thacker, 
1998). Moreover, while for Leder in vivo imaging 
technologies are primarily estranging, revealing an 
alien and unknowable bodyscape, this overlooks the 
way in which we have quite readily digested the more 
familiar somatic terrain of X-ray and ultrasound, and 
even found them both empowering as evidence of 
effective surgery or implants, and cherishable as first 
baby photos. Indeed, biomedical macro- and micro-
perceptual imaging manifests our lively insides to 
sociotechnical apprehension in such a way that it is no 
longer possible to make clear ontic distinctions 
between culturally inscribed body surface and 
exscribed organic or natural interior.  
 
Perhaps particularly in the context of modern 
instrumentally-mediated medicine - technoscience - 
any attempt to position the body as a pre-technical or 
organic point of origin is interrupted when we 
acknowledge that the body appears only as it is 
revealed through the instrumental logic and trajectory 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 6, Edition 1 May 2006  Page 10 of 13 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This document is subject to 
copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the 
publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
 
of the technological ensemble itself (Waldby, 1999, p. 
21). For example, MRI as a computerised conversion 
technology must translate the behaviour of hydrogen 
atoms within the body into data, and this binary code 
must then be made to correspond in very precise ways 
to pixels of greyscale in order to compose a coherent 
image. This kind of instrumental embodiment or 
infosoma is only possible with the processing speeds 
and memory capacity of recent computer technology. 
Moreover, the computer cannot simply “see” inside 
the body; the corpus must first be metamorphosed as 
a data-compatible or computational substance. This 
new technoscientific circumspection is first 
established as part of the scientist’s own partial, 
mediated and expert perception, and then into popular 
scientific knowledge more generally. In films such as 
Hollow Man (Wick, 2000) and The Fifth Element 
(Ledoux, 1997), for example, MR imaging techniques 
and software, such as those used in the Visible 
Human Project, are appropriated to represent the body 
as a completely evident and discriminate accretion of 
layers, which can be built from the inside out (The 
Fifth Element), or visually peeled from skin to 
marrow (Hollow Man). Thus eventually these 
volumetric representations of the endosoma become a 
part of our own culturally and technologically 
contingent perceptions of the body, and finally they 
are incompletely and variably assimilated into our 




Scientific discourse is both intrinsic to, and 
inseparable from, the ways in which we understand 
and live our bodies in contemporary Western culture. 
Both within its own domain, and in its frequent 
incursions into popular media, such discourse has 
delivered the images with which we comprehend our 
biology and its constitution. Feminist philosophers of 
science have long recognised that, if specifically 
feminist analyses continue to ignore biology, or to 
theorise the body primarily in terms of its corporeal 
perimeter, technoscientific and biomedical discourse 
will itself remain invulnerable to critique. Molecular 
genetics, in particular, has become a primary 
instrumental mode of understanding about the 
organisation of life, and an increasing range of 
behaviours are attributed to genetic causes. Yet, as 
theorists such as Keller (1995) and Spanier (1995) 
have suggested, the reductionist model of hierarchical 
control within molecular biology, where DNA is 
represented as the “master molecule”, is only one 
among many possible interpretations or bio-cultural 
paradigms. Instead of focusing on command and 
control, for example, human biologists could focus on 
metabolism and the flow of energy from the sun, thus 
centralising the agency of energy conversion systems 
rather than informatic code (Spanier, 1995). Such 
views are as accurate as those made about DNA, but 
are derived from a different focus and a different set 
of assumptions about what constitutes life. Recent 
cultural analyses of medical science and its 
visualising practices by Waldby, Cartwright, Stafford 
and others are also effective enablements of this kind 
of critique.7 As earlier argued, post-phenomenological 
accounts of endosoma in their specificity also 
contribute a crucial component to contemporary 
theorisations of the body.  
 
In this paper we have suggested that a critical and 
alternative construal of technoscientific vision, 
specifically biomedical imaging and MRI, and the 
various practices and agencies surrounding their use, 
can complicate dominant accounts of technovisual 
apparatuses within medical science. As we have 
suggested, the presumption that imaging technologies 
enable pure transparency draws on a dichotomous 
logic of knowing - one which separates an observer 
from a world of external objects that can be 
independently accessed and properly known. Yet, 
when the process of observation becomes 
irrecoverably perplexed by the operative dialects of 
binary code, radio waves, magnetic fields and visceral 
specificity, perceiver and object enter an altered order 
of knowing which radically shifts the relationship 
between vision and truth. The relation between 
perception and apparatus, and between body and tool, 
in the deployment of magnetic resonance imaging is 
an irreducibly collaborative and specific kind of truth.  
It is a technosomatic compromise of ontological 
difference. Rather than a collection of autonomous 
and distinct entities contributing to a cohesive telos of 
discovery and cure, we would argue that bodies, 
apparatuses and imagers comprise an often untidy and 
intercorporeal ensemble of human and non-human 
agencies. Indeed, the medium- or techno-specificity 
of magnetic resonance imaging, and the info-soma 
                                                 
7 Linda Treichler, Lisa Cartwright and Constance 
Penley (Eds.). (1998). The visible woman: Imaging 
technologies, gender and science. New York: New 
York University Press; Lynda Birke (1999). 
Feminism and the biological body. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press;  Lisa Cartwright (1995). 
Screening the body: Tracing medicine’s visual 
culture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; 
Barbara Stafford (1993). Body criticism: Imaging the 
unseen in enlightenment art and medicine. 
Cambridge: MIT Press;  M. Berg and A. Mol (Eds.). 
(1998). Differences in medicine: Unravelling 
practices, techniques and bodies. London: Duke 
University Press;  Cathy Waldby (2000). The Visible 
Human Project: Informatic bodies and posthuman 
medicine. New York: Routledge. 
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both produced by and producing such visions, 
antagonise the fundamental tenets and assumptions of 
the conventional ocularcentric trajectory, including 
medicine’s claims to being a disembodied, impartial, 
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